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At the outset we should emphasize that nothing in
Hayward and Tarr’s commentary speaks to the main
results of the Biederman and Bar (1999) report: Slight
costs of rotation in detecting geon differences when
matching a sequential pair of novel objects (3.3% in-
crease in error rates), but massive costs (46.2% increase
in error rates) in the detection of metric differences.
Their comments are all addressed to our review of the
literature of the relatively small costs (versus zero costs)
that have been observed when geon differences were,
presumably, available. Although they characterize some
of Biederman and Bar’s arguments as ‘incorrect’, in fact
these arguments can readily be defended. Given the
sensitivity that prompted these authors to write their
comments, it is disappointing that their own characteri-
zation of many of Biederman and Bar’s points are
inaccurate.
It is not completely clear why the origin of these
relatively small rotation costs are an important theoret-
ical issue to Hayward and Tarr insofar as they have
now ‘eschewed’ mental rotation mechanisms (their note
2). Instead, viewpoint costs are now regarded by these
authors as reflecting changes in information and that
‘there is no directly causal relation between the magni-
tude of a change in viewpoint of an object, and the
magnitude of the associated cost in recognition’ (note
2). This has been our position all along (Biederman,
1987; Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993, 1995; Bieder-
man & Bar, 1999).
1. Why assigning arbitrary names to novel objects
may be problematic for assessing the view dependence:
independence of object representations
Consider a visual classification task in which brief
masked pictures of tables are presented to the left of
fixation and brief masked pictures of chairs are pre-
sented to the right of fixation. An observer required to
distinguish between chairs and tables might readily use
the left–right view information to achieve high accu-
racy on such a task. However, few would accept such
evidence of ‘view-based recognition’ as addressing is-
sues concerned with the ‘mental representation of ob-
jects’ especially if that mental representation was to be
interpreted as a representation of shape. An alternative
position, proposed by Biederman and Cooper (1992), is
that these viewpoint effects may be part of the episodic
representation that specifies view variables and situa-
tion variables bound to a representation, perhaps im-
plicit, of shape. That there might be at least two
representations of objects is evidenced by Biederman
and Cooper’s (1992) finding that changes in the size of
an image had no effect on basic-level name priming but
produced marked interference in old-new, episodic
recognition judgments. It is important to note that the
first block of trials — basic level naming — was
identical for the two tasks (Unlike experimental trained
naming of novel stimuli, basic level naming is well
practiced to be independent of view variables, such as
an object’s position in the visual field or whether it is
facing left or right). Biederman and Cooper’s interpre-
tation was that the basic-level name priming was medi-
ated by a representation invariant to view variables but
that the old–new judgments were mediated by an
episodic representation that combined shape and view-
variables. Similar results (no effects on priming but
large costs on old judgements) were reported by Bieder-
man and Cooper (1991a,b) and Cooper, Biederman,
and Hummel (1992) for position, reflection, and
orientation.
Hayward and Tarr’s comments would imply that
there is a single, all-purpose, representation and that
any variable that affects object recognition performance
is, ipso facto, reflecting this single representation. Our
position is perhaps more consistent with the classical
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phenomenon of object constancy — that there is a
representation of an object’s shape independent of its
position, size, and orientation (up to occlusion and
accretion). However, there is also an episodic represen-
tation that, in combining shape with view variables,
might be employed on a particular object recognition
task. The degree to which it is employed, as noted by
Biederman and Gerhardstein (1993), might well depend
on its scale. Large shape differences would dominate
smaller scale view variables but large view differences
could dominate small shape differences, as suggested by
the tables on left, chairs on right example.
In any event, as argued by Biederman and Gerhard-
stein (1993), the absence of rotation costs means that
there is little to explain, assuming that there is sufficient
power in the design to have detected a cost. The
presence of rotation costs obligates the investigator to
determine the cause of such costs. Hayward and Tarr’s
point that the rotation costs with naming tasks are
consistent with other rotation costs is not particularly
persuasive insofar as the origin of these costs is not
clear. In addition to reflecting episodic representations,
these costs may stem from resolution difficulties and
transient shifts, as described below. Most important,
given the immediate and extraordinarily large gain
from distinctive GSDs, which are almost always avail-
able when humans are attempting to distinguish basic-
and subordinate-level visual classes, the contribution of
view-specific representations of shape would seem to be
modest indeed (Biederman, Subramaniam, Bar, Kaloc-
sai, & Fiser, 1999).
2. Contribution of resolution difficulties and near
accidents to rotation costs when distinctive GSDs were
present
Hayward and Tarr (1997) and Tarr, Williams, Hay-
ward, and Gauthier (1998) reported rotation costs for
images that, in their subjective judgments, were ‘ex-
tremely easy to discriminate’. Subjective judgments of
ease of recognition can dramatically underestimate dif-
ferences in perceptibility (Biederman, Hilton, & Hum-
mel, 1991). However, near accidents and resolution
variations could have contributed to the modest rota-
tion costs they observed in their studies, as described
below. Moreover, their stimuli were hardly on an ex-
treme of discrimination ease. Compare, for example,
Hayward and Tarr’s (1997) two-part novel objects with
a set of stimuli that could be composed of the two-part
novel original objects in Biederman and Bar (1999)
(The same-different matching task in Biederman and
Bar’s experiment required detection of subtle changes
of one of the geons from the same original object rather
than between different original objects). Different origi-
nal objects from the Biederman and Bar (1999) experi-
ment would clearly be far easier to distinguish than
those of Hayward and Tarr’s, with little of the difficulty
in segmenting the smaller geon from the larger geon in
many of the poses shown in Hayward and Tarr. If
Hayward and Tarr’s objects are to be regarded as
‘extremely easy to discriminate’, should a selection of
original objects from Biederman and Bar’s (1999) ex-
periment be regarded as ‘extremely, extremely easy to
discriminate?’ Interestingly, Hayward and Tarr do not
take issue with Biederman and Bar’s (1999) expectation
that little or no rotation costs would be observed if
subjects had to discriminate among the original objects.
Tarr et al. (1998) reported rotation costs for the
single geon objects that were identical to those of
Biederman and Gerhardstein (1993, Experiment 3). Bie-
derman and Gerhardstein (1993) did not take pains to
equate all their stimulus pairs in similarity at all orien-
tations — indeed, they remarked on the presence of
near accidents in their stimuli. Biederman and Gerhard-
stein (1993, 1995) also explicitly noted the possibility
that resolution variations and near accidents could have
contributed to the small rotation effects that they ob-
served. The marked variation in false alarm rates, from
0 to 100%, in the confusion matrix in Biederman and
Gerhardstein’s (1993) Exp. 3 is objective evidence that
there was considerable variability in the similarity from
stimulus pair to stimulus pair. It would be instructive to
know whether in the data of Tarr et al. (1998) the
contribution to the rotation costs (RTs in their case)
did not come from those stimulus pairs where resolu-
tion was difficult.
Concerning the high error rates in the Biederman and
Gerhardstein’s (1993) Exp. 3, Hayward and Tarr write:
‘Since we presume the goal of any theory of recognition
is accurate recognition, it seems more likely that the
poor performance obtained by Biederman and Ger-
hardstein does not reflect standard recognition
processes’.
We disagree. The goal of a theory of biological
recognition is recognition beha6ior. People make errors,
particularly when attempting to discriminate small dif-
ferences under brief, masked exposures. Geon Theory’s
assignment of a component of task difficulty to failures
of resolution is entirely consistent with a vast body of
psychophysical literature. If the discrimination of a
contour, say, was required to distinguish between two
objects, then difficulty in discriminating that contour
should be reflected in object recognition performance.
3. Many of the studies showing rotation costs used
rotation angles where resolution changes could have
contributed to rotation costs
4. Reflections and 180° rotations that restore the
object’s parts show relatively smaller costs, in contrasts
to expectations of view-based theories
Biederman and Bar (1999) did not maintain, as ar-
gued by Hayward and Tarr, that larger rotations, in
general, were more appropriate for the testing of rota-
tion effects. We merely noted that 180° rotation (or
reflection) of bilaterally symmetrical objects offer a
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clear test of rotation costs where resolution variations
are not at issue. (Hayward and Tarr are correct in
pointing out that many orientations, e.g. the front and
back of an airplane, would provide different part struc-
tures from a 180° rotation. We should have specified
views that restore the parts, as side views of such
objects.) The invariance of performance for such reflec-
tions — as reported by Biederman and Cooper
(1991a,b) — is a clear challenge to the metric templates
espoused by a number of theorists. As noted by Bieder-
man and Gerhardstein (1993) cost functions over rota-
tion angle are often nonmonotonic, declining from 90
to 180° for near side views of bilaterally symmetrical
objects. Thus smaller costs are obtained than would be
predicted by rotations of 30° to 90° where occlusion
and foreshortening do affect the images. A rotation of
30° would, on average, produce smaller degrees of
self-occlusion and ‘near accidents’, than one of 90°, but
these resolution effects are reduced as rotation of bilat-
erally symmetrical objects increases towards 180°. So
the cost functions follow the resolution difficulties —
not the rotation angle. These resolution and near acci-
dent effects are difficult to avoid and, insofar as they
depend on the initial arbitrarily defined 0° view, there is
no simple relation between rotation angle and these
effects. It was for precisely this reason that Biederman
and Bar abandoned the use of a constant rotation angle
for all objects and employed different rotation angles,
ranging from 20 to 120°, for each of their objects.
Hayward and Tarr assert that in their (1997) study ‘‘…
there were no changes in the 6isible parts of any of the
objects shown in the study.’’ (Italics theirs.) This, of
course, is impossible, as there will be some foreshorten-
ing and lengthening of surfaces and contours with
depth rotation.
Hayward and Tarr argue that the Tarr et al. (1998)
study showed ‘costs across precisely the range of view-
points advocated by Biederman and Bar’. But this is
not true. We advocated viewpoints that were a 180°
rotation from the 0° viewpoint. Tarr et al. (1998) used
viewpoints that ‘spanned 180°; 90° in each direction
from the training viewpoint’. (Hayward and Tarr, point
4). So their maximum viewpoint change was not 180°,
but 90° — the view change that, on average, tends to
maximize occlusion and accidental effects relative to the
0° view.
Hayward and Tarr note that some very recent models
(e.g. Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999, but they could have
cited an earlier model by Mel, 1997) are not of the
metric template kind that Biederman and Bar address.
This is true. In positing a central role to view-invariant
features and discarding a 2D coordinate space, such
models come closer to what we have been advocating
all along. One wonders about the findings that moti-
vated this drastic change. Hayward and Tarr state that
the older variety of template models, e.g. Poggio and
Edelman, 1990, would predict reflection invariance but
this was not a characteristic of that model and certainly
not a characteristic of mental rotation.
5. Biederman and Bar (1999) [and Biederman and
Gerhardstein (1993, 1995)] noted that ‘‘… rotation in
depth tends to produce drastic changes in the 2D image
that can differentially affect the perceptibility of the
parts’’ (Biederman & Bar, p. 2896)
Hayward and Tarr erroneously interpret this state-
ment to mean that rotations, in general, make percepti-
bility more difficult. The only reasonable interpretation
of our statement, especially given the context and that
0° views were balanced, is that if some parts were more
readily resolved at one view and other parts at other
views, then rotation costs might be produced by these
differences in perceptibility at the different orientations,
as noted in our response to the previous point.
In this section, Hayward and Tarr assert that similar
orientation differences produced similar orientation
costs for different objects. We here simply repeat from
Biederman and Bar (1999), the findings of Biederman
and Bar (1998) in matching bent paper clip stimuli:
There were gigantic differences in the rotation costs and
false alarm rates from stimulus pair to stimulus pair at
the same orientation differences. These differences were
readily interpretable in terms of the nonaccidental fea-
ture differences (produced by accidental configurations
of the clips, as discussed by Biederman & Gerhardstein,
1993). Nonaccidental differences between two views of
the same clip produced high miss rates. When such
differences were absent in views of two different clips,
false alarm rates were extremely high (up to 85%).
6. Rendered images. ‘‘This statement clearly indi-
cates that Biederman and Bar believe that rendered
images are somehow less appropriate stimuli than line
drawings for studying human visual recognition’’
Biederman and Bar’s statement was that ‘‘rendered
images, as compared to line drawings, typically have
lower contrast and illumination and shadow contours
that can increase the difficulty of determining the orien-
tation and depth discontinuities important for resolving
the geons’’ (p. 2896). To the extent to which this shape
information may be difficult to resolve, other sources of
information may be employed, as discussed previously.
Our statement is absolutely clear. It was motivated by
our observations that a distinguishing part in rendered
images of novel objects was sometimes difficult to
resolve at brief presentations. This led to our use of
somewhat longer exposure durations relative to previ-
ous studies insofar as we were using rendered images.
With the rendered novel images (Biederman & Bar,
1998), the longer exposure durations, in fact, led to
reduced rotation costs.
Nothing in Biederman and Bar’s statements indicated
that we think that line drawings have more ecological
validity than rendered images (and those, of course, are
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not identical to real objects). Hayward and Tarr go on
to question whether a line drawing marking the orienta-
tion and depth discontinuities can be extracted by the
human visual system and cite an experiment by
Sanocki, Bowyer, Heath, and Sarkar (1998) as evidence
for their point. But the Sanocki et al. experiment
merely showed that subjects are not as able to recognize
the output of a particular edge detector, that devised by
Canny (1986), compared with original photography.
The Canny edge finder decidedly does not produce a
line drawing of the depth and orientation discontinu-
ities of an object but, instead, misses some of the
desired discontinuities and produces additional edges
from luminance and texture changes. Contrary to Hay-
ward and Tarr’s claims, people have no trouble point-
ing to the orientation and depth discontinuities of novel
objects. Well-designed assembly instructions for toys
and other products almost always include line drawings
of the parts, despite the additional expense incurred in
making such drawings. Moreover, a monkey IT cell
responding to a color photograph of an object, gener-
ally maintains its tuning preference to line drawings of
that object (Kova´cs, Sa´ry, Ko¨teles, Chadaide, &
Benedek, 1998) and recent work has indicated that
monkeys trained to respond differentially to a set of ten
color photographs of objects, readily transfer to line
drawings of those objects (G. Kova´cs, personnel com-
munication, 2000). Hayward and Tarr also cite the
Biederman and Ju (1988) study showing equivalence in
identification performance in line drawings and color
photography. Ignoring the inconsistency of this citation
with their prior point that line drawings cannot be
extracted from natural images, Biederman and Ju had
to undertake several tries with a professional photogra-
pher to reduce (but not eliminate) the problem of part
resolution in their color photographs.
7. Contribution of transient shifts to rotation costs
Biederman and Bar (1999) noted that in sequential
same-different matching of depth-rotated objects, any
difference in the local areas occupied by the first and
second images can result in a signal that something has
changed. Only on 0°-SAME trials is there no change in
the spatial positions. The absence of any S1–S2 change
could thus serve as a completely reliable cue to respond
SAME, which, by artifactually lowering RTs at 0°,
would contribute to a positive slope over rotation an-
gle. Biederman and Bar (1998) found precisely such an
effect. When they translated S2 (with respect to S1) on
all trials, RTs for SAME responses at 0° increased
compared to an untranslated condition, producing a
reduction in slopes (costs) over rotation angle, as there
was little effect of shifting on the rotated trials. Hay-
ward and Tarr report that Hayward and Williams
(2000) found that with a translation there was still a
monotonically increasing rotation cost. As Hayward
and Williams did not use a no-shift control, this de-
scription of their results omits the critical point of
whether the slope was reduced by the translation.
Biederman and Bar (1999) noted that, in contrast to
Tarr’s (1995) theoretical position of template extrapola-
tion-interpolation (at small rotation angles):mental ro-
tation (at larger rotation angles), the rotation cost
function is positively accelerated, not negatively acceler-
ated (Tarr, 1995). That is, the difference between 0 and
30° produced greater costs than between 30 and 60°.
The relatively steeper slope near 0° could have been
produced by a transient artifact. In asserting that the
rotation costs were monotonic, Hayward and Tarr fail
to address our point that template transformations
would lead to positive, not the obtained negative,
acceleration.
In considering a possible neural basis of the transient
shift signal, Biederman and Bar cited a result of Nowak
and Bullier (1997) who reported a fast magnocellular
transient response in IT cells. Biederman and Bar
(1999) (p. 2887) explicitly noted that: ‘Because of the
intervening mask, the transient in the present case
would have to be one which was a function of the
difference between S2 and an actively maintained repre-
sentation of S1. Active maintenance would be necessary
to avoid the disruption of the mask. Indeed, this is the
subjective impression of what one is doing when per-
forming the task’. Hayward and Tarr ignore our qual-
ification and repeat our point that the mask would
furnish a transient. It is an empirical issue, of course, as
to whether active maintenance of S1 in a sequential
matching task: (a) reduces the transient from the mask;
and:or (b) enhances a transient from any S1–S2 differ-
ences. There is, indeed, no evidence for the neural basis
of this hypothesis: Not because investigators looked for
such an effect and failed to find it, but rather because
no one, as yet, has looked.
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